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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JIM CRITTENDEN,

:

PlaintiffAppellant,

:

Case No. 970091-CA

:

Oral Argument
Priority 15

vs.
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT,
DefendantAppellee.

:
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-3(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
This case concerns two issues:
1.

Whether Alpine School District denied appellant Jim

Crittenden of his employment without an adequate pre-termination
hearing in violation of his right to due process.
2.

Whether appellant Jim Crittenden was entitled to early

retirement benefits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a breach of contract action, the appellate
court must address questions both of fact and of law. In a summary
judgment context, the facts are to be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, while the legal issues are to be reviewed for
correctness.
App. 1992).

Stevenson v. F. C. Life Ins. Co.. 827 P.2d 973 (Utah

With regard to Mr. Crittenden's early retirement benefits,
the appellate court is obliged to construe plaintiff's complaint in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the judgment can be
affirmed only if it clearly appears that there is no set of facts
that can support the plaintiff's claim.

Olsen v. Hoolev, 865 P.2d

1345, 1346 (Utah 1993); Colman v. Utah State Landlord, 795 P.2d 622
(Utah 1990); Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107 (Utah
App.

1990).

On summary judgment, this issue is reviewed for

correctness, since factual disputes are automatically resolved in
the

appellant's

favor,

and

the

only

remaining

issue

is

a

determination of how the facts apply to the law governing early
retirement.

Stevenson, 827 P.2d at 973.
PERTINENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case.

This is a wrongful termination

action arising from the termination of appellant by the appellee.
This action also involves deprivation by the appellee of early
retirement benefits to which appellant asserts a claim.
B.

Proceedings Below.

Mr. Crittenden filed a motion for

summary judgment on May 31, 1996, to which the defendant filed a
cross-motion on June 14, 1996.

The Court granted the defendant's

motion, ruling that, even in the amended complaint, Crittenden was
challenging only the manner in which he was terminated, and that
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nothing was amiss, either within district policy or within the law,
with the manner of Crittenden's termination.

(Ruling, at 3-11)

The Court also ruled that (a) Crittenden was not entitled to
early retirement because the request was past a district-imposed
deadline, (b) Crittenden was not "employed* at the time of his
request, and (c) that Crittenden was not in the class of employees
for which early retirement was intended.
C.

(Ruling, at 11-13)

Facts. In 1991, appellant, Mr. Jim Crittenden, was the

director of transportation for appellee, Alpine School District,
and had been an employee of the school district for 33 years.
(Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
5 6; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants7
Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material Undisputed
Facts, 1 1)
On June 5, 1991, the assistant superintendent of the
Alpine School District met with Mr. Crittenden for 15 to 20 minutes
(Affidavit of Jim F. Crittenden, J5 3-6), asking Mr. Crittenden if
he had used school district purchase orders to buy approximately
$650 (Affidavit of Gary V. Keetch, Exhibit A) worth of parts for
vehicles belonging to Mr. Crittenden and a friend of his.

Mr.

Crittenden answered that he had, but was not given an opportunity
to explain why or to point out that his actions were common and
accepted practices in the school district. (Affidavit of Jim F.
Crittenden, f 6; Crittenden Depo. at 46, 51, 58, 61, 171)

Mr.

Crittenden did, however, mention that he would like to take early
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retirement. (Affidavit of Gary V. Keetch, Exhibit A) The assistant
superintendent told him to go home and wait to hear from the school
district. (Affidavit of Jim F. Crittenden, f 6)
Mr. Crittenden and the assistant superintendent met
again later that day for five or ten minutes. (Affidavit of Jim F.
Crittenden, f 9)

The assistant superintendent had Mr. Crittenden

read a letter from the school district explaining that he was being
placed on immediate suspension without pay and would be terminated
in 15 days. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material
Undisputed Facts, If 12-13) Again, Mr. Crittenden was not given an
opportunity to explain his actions, but he again requested early
retirement. (Affidavit of Jim F. Crittenden, f 9; Affidavit of Gary
V. Keetch, Exhibits A)
The following day, Mr. Crittenden formally submitted a
written

request

for

early

retirement.

(Affidavit

of

Jim

F.

Crittenden, f 15; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Material
Undisputed Facts, f 15)

The school district conducted a post-

termination hearing in September, 1991, after which it informed Mr.
Crittenden that his termination had been upheld. (Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Statement of Material Undisputed Facts, ff 18, 20)
Mr. Crittenden filed suit in January, 1993, and alleged
that the manner of his termination was improper and that he was
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entitled to early retirement benefits. (Complaint and Demand for
Jury Trial)

He filed an amended complaint on August 30, 1996, in

which he further alleged that the district breached the employment
contract. (Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial)
Alpine School District has stated that it "objects to
and deplores any insinuation on the part of the plaintiff to
suggest that defendant denied plaintiff early retirement due to a
clerical oversight in the filling out of forms."

(Defendant's

Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, #26).
fact,

Alpine

communicated

School

District

expressly

stated

that

In

tt

[a]s

over and over to plaintiff and his attorney by

defendant and its attorney in 1991, plaintiff failed to qualify for
district early retirement because his employment was involuntarily
terminated due to criminal acts." (Id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment in favor of Alpine School District was
improper because there are disputed issues of material fact and the
District Court incorrectly applied the law to the facts.
Summary

judgment

regarding

the

adequacy

of

the

pr ex-

termination hearing should be reversed because it is disputed
whether Mr. Crittenden had an opportunity to "tell his side of the
story," and whether his further explanation would have altered the
course of his termination.

Also, the cases on which the District

Court relied are distinguishable from this one.
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Summary

judgment

regarding

his

entitlement

to

early

retirement benefits should also be reversed because Mr. Crittenden
had a vested right to the benefits and Alpine School District was
contractually

obligated

to

grant

them.

The

District

Court

improperly based its decision on the timeliness of his application,
an argument Alpine School District waived or otherwise failed to
plead.

The District Court also based its decision on terms it

improperly imposed on school district policy regarding restrictions
on eligibility for the early retirement benefits. Furthermore, if
under the policy the early retirement benefits are limited to
workers who "need to get away from the daily grind," there is a
disputed issue of fact regarding whether that was part of Mr.
Crittenden's motivation for applying for the benefits. Finally, he
was deprived of the benefits without due process.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PRE-TERMINATION HEARING
In considering whether there exist genuine issues of material
fact, the Court does not weigh the evidence, but instead inquires
whether a reasonable jury faced with the evidence presented could
return a verdict for the non-moving party.

W. M. Barnes Co. v.

Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981); Spor v.
Crested Butte Silver Mining. Inc.. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987).

All

material facts properly asserted and supported by a party shall be
deemed admitted unless specifically controverted by the opposing
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party.

Further, the trial court must interpret the relevant facts

in a light favorable to the non-moving party.

Stevenson v. F. C.

Life Ins. Co.. 827 P.2d 973 (Utah App. 1992).
In this case, there are issues of fact regarding the adequacy
of Mr. Crittenden's pre-termination hearing which were improperly
resolved in favor of Alpine School District, and which should have
precluded summary judgment.

It is undisputed that Mr. Crittenden

was an employee of the school district with a constitutionally
protected property interest in his employment.

As such, he was

entitled to a pre-termination hearing under Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill. 105 S.Ct. 1487 (1985).
Supreme Court

in Loudermill

explained

hearing "need not be elaborate."

that

The United States
a pre-termination

Nevertheless, it identified the

elements essential to an adequate pre-termination hearing.
Court stated that,

The

,f

[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to

oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation
of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side
of the story.ff

Id^ at 1497.

In this case there is a factual dispute as to whether Mr.
Crittenden was given an opportunity to present his side of the
story prior to termination.

He had one meeting with the assistant

superintendent prior to termination which lasted no more than 15 to
20 minutes.
opportunity

According to Mr. Crittenden, he did not have an
to

explain

his

actions,

a

fact

that

interpreted in a light favorable to Mr. Crittenden.
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should

be

Part of Mr.

Crittenden's explanation, had he been permitted to voice it, would
have been that his actions were actually common and accepted
practice in the school district, another fact that should be
interpreted in a light favorable to him, and which would have been
relevant to whether the termination was erroneous, and whether the
penalty was proportional to the infraction.

See, Salt Lake City

Corp, v. Salt Lake Citv Civ. Serv. , 908 P.2d 871 (Utah 1995),
(holding that in disciplining civil servants, the penalty must be
proportional to the infraction).
Furthermore, this case is distinguishable from the cases on
which

the District

determination.
case

was

Court

relied

as authority

for

its

legal

The District Court held that the hearing in this

sufficiently

similar

to

the

hearings

sustained

as

constitutionally sound in Powell v. Mikuleckv. 891 F.2d 1454 (10th
Cir. 1989), and Kellv v. Smith. 764 F.2d 1412 (11th Cir. 1985).

A

closer look at those cases is enlightening.
In Powell the court found that the employee had been afforded
an opportunity to explain his side of the story because the
employee had ended the discussion by refusing to respond to further
inquiries.

Powell, 891 F.2d at 1459.

In this case, however, Mr.

Crittenden was not able to fully explain his side of the story
because he was directed to go home and wait to hear from the school
district.
Like Mr. Crittenden's meeting with Alpine School District
administrators, the hearing in Kelly was also very brief, but the
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court in Kellv nonetheless sustained the hearing as adequate. This
is because the reason the employee gave in his defense for failing
to fulfill an obligation of his employment, that he was not on-call
at the time, was untrue and within the personal knowledge of the
supervisor terminating him.

In this case, however, Alpine School

District had no knowledge of Mr. Crittenden's reasons for his
conduct, nor did Alpine School District ask for, nor did it desire
any explanation or reason for Mr. Crittenden's actions. Mr. Crittenden, given the opportunity, could have and would have provided
explanations of his conduct which were not known by the assistant
superintendent and which would have been relevant to whether the
termination was warranted.

Similarly, the other cases cited in

Powell, Riacrins v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska,
790 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1986), and Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827
(1st Cir. 1985), are also distinguishable from the instant case.
Those cases involved pre-termination hearings which lasted an hour
or more—substantially longer than Mr. Crittenden's pre-termination
meeting with Alpine School District officials.

Because the cases

it cited in its decision were not on-point, the District Court's
reliance upon those cases in its decision was in error.
Recognizing these disputed issues of fact, the District Court
erred by making

its own factual determinations.

Instead of

interpreting the facts in a light favorable to Mr. Crittenden, the
District Court determined that 15 to 20 minutes gave the parties
ample time for "some other give and take."

b

(Ruling, at 10-11) . In

other words, the District Court weighed the evidence and took from
a jury a determination that properly belonged to it. Mr. Crittenden had satisfied his burden of showing a disputed issue of fact,
and he should have been permitted to elaborate to a jury the
reasons he was prevented him from telling his side of the story.
Because of the existence of these factual disputes and erroneous
legal conclusions, summary judgment in favor of Alpine School
District was improper and should be reversed.
POINT II
EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFITS.

A.

Vesting

Of Early Retirement

Benefits.

As a general rule, the adoption of a pension plan by an
employer is an offer for a unilateral contract, such that the plan
may be viewed as an offer to the employee. An employee accepts the
offer by his or her continued employment, and continued employment
constitutes the underlying consideration

for the promise.

A

pension plan is thus "an offer which ripens into a contract upon
the fulfillment of conditions by the performance of the employee.11
Auerbach's. Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d

376, 378

(Utah

1911);

Schofield v. Zions Co-Qp Mercantile Institution. 85 Utah 281
(1934) .
When an employee makes ,fthe requisite contributions and [has]
satisfied all conditions precedent to his benefits, then the
employee [has] a *vested right' in his retirement benefits.11 Ellis
v. Utah State Retirement Board. 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah App. 1988).
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The pension plan, as outlined in Alpine School District's Policy
No. 4752, provides that in order for an employee to fulfill the
conditions for early retirement benefits, the employee must either
••have accumulated 30 years of educational service in Alpine School
District and choose to retire early (prior to the 65th birthday);
or . . . have attained 30 years of service in Utah and have at
least 15 years of services in Alpine School District."

(Alpine

School District Policy No. 4752.1.3.1 and 4752.1.3.3 (1986)).
Jim Crittenden began employment with Alpine School District
in 1957, and his contract with Alpine School District "ripened" in
1987, when, at age 52, he attained 30 years of service in Alpine
School District and chose to seek early retirement.

"The offer is

[sic] such cases constitutes a promise for a completed act, and
once the act is completed by the acceptor the offer cannot be
modified or withdrawn.

It becomes a binding contract."

Auer-

bach's. Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376, 378 (Utah 1977) (quoting
Schofield v. Zions CO-OP Mercantile Institution. 85 Utah 281, 287
(1934)).
When Jim Crittenden reached 30 years of service for Alpine
School District, the requisite act was completed and he fulfilled
his part of the early retirement contract.
Alpine

School

District

became

bound

retirement benefits to Jim Crittenden.
modified or withdrawn."

to

At that same time,
its

offer

of

early

The offer could not "be

Thus, by refusing to grant Jim Crittenden

*1

his early retirement benefits, Alpine School District did not
fulfill its part of the contract.

Timeliness

B.

The District Court's primary rationale for upholding the
denial of Mr. Crittenden's early retirement benefits relies upon
Alpine School District's assertion that Mr. Crittenden failed to
apply for the benefits before March 1, 1991.

Secondarily, the

District Court relies upon the fact that there is no language to
the effect that early retirement benefits are available to persons
who are terminated for cause.
Mr. Crittenden, however, contends that Alpine School District's decision to deny Mr. Crittenden his early

retirement

benefits was not based upon any question of timeliness, nor was the
denial based upon any policy provision. Alpine School District did
not assert timeliness as a defense, it did not raise timeliness an
issue in its motion for summary judgment, and it has expressly
stated that timeliness was not the reason why Mr. Crittenden's
benefits were denied.

2.

Waiver

The district chose to deny Mr. Crittenden early retirement
benefits not for any failure to meet application deadlines, but
"because

his

employment

was

involuntarily

terminated

due

to

criminal acts." (Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, #26.).
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In fact, while the District Court based its decision largely
upon the question of timeliness, Alpine School Districts motion
for summary judgment did not even raise the timeliness issue.
Alpine School District's Motion for Summary Judgment does not
assert as a defense or as grounds for denial of the benefits that
timeliness was a factor; rather, Alpine School District argues that
"This court should rule as a matter of law that plaintiff did not
qualify for district early retirement benefits, because he did not
retire

early

from

employment;

he was terminated

for cause."

(Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
at 25).

The district makes no mention of the timeliness issue as

a basis for its motion.
Mr. Crittenden pointed out to the District Court that in
answers to

interrogatories

and

in depositions, Alpine

School

District had denied that Mr. Crittenden's applications for early
retirement benefits were rejected because they were not timely.
(Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
at

2,

5).

Nonetheless,

the District

Court

found

that

the

timeliness defense, though not pled, was controlling. The District
Court thus held that Alpine School District did not waive the
timeliness issue because it was not a "distinctly made" waiver.
(Ruling, at 11).
But notwithstanding Alpine School District's assertion that
the timeliness issue was not determinative, and its failure to
assert the defense in its pleadings, the District Court acted on

i3

its own motion and ruled as a matter of law that Mr. Crittenden was
not entitled to early retirement benefits because he did not make
a timely application. Thus, the District Court's decision that the
timeliness issue is controlling was in error.
C.

"Type

of

Administrator"

for

Whom the

Benefits

Were

Meant
The District Court found that, ancillary to the timeliness
issue, the reason Mr. Crittenden was not

entitled

to

early

retirement benefits was that because of his termination for cause,
he was not the

"type11 of

administrator

for whom

the

early

retirement benefits were designed. Mr. Crittenden made it clear to
the District Court that no language existed in the school district
policy

which

expressly

precludes

him

from

retirement benefits otherwise available to him.

receiving

early

The policy does

not say that early retirement benefits are not available to persons
who are terminated for cause.

The policy simply does not address

that issue.
While in some cases specified misconduct by an employee may
result in forfeiture of pension or retirement benefits, especially
where a contractual retirement provision states that an employee
discharged for dishonesty is not entitled to receive any payment
from the fund, no such contractual provisions exist either in
Alpine School District policies or in the Utah Code.

In the event

of any ambiguity of interpretation of the contract, the language of
the pension contract should be liberally construed in favor of the
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pensioner.

Driacrs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 142

P.2d 657 (Utah 1943).
But while no part of the Alpine School District policy
provides for denial of early retirement benefits to employees who
are terminated for cause, Alpine School District policy provisions
do provide for the distribution of early retirement benefits to
administrators who have met one of the following criteria:
1.3.1

Have accumulated 30 years
of educational service in
Alpine School District
and choose to retire
early
(prior
to the
sixty-fifth birthday) ; or

1.3.2

Have
completed
immediately prior to the
request
for
early
retirement a minimum of
ten years professional
experience
in
Alpine
School District, be at
least sixty years of age,
and not have reached the
sixty-fifth birthday; or

1.3.3

Have attained at least 30
years of service in Utah
and have at least 15
years
of
service
in
Alpine School District.

(Alpine School District Policy No. 4752.1.3.1-3).

Mr. Crittenden

met all three of those criteria, and by the language of the policy,
was, in fact, the type of administrator for whom the benefits were
meant.
In addition, Mr. Crittenden is currently collecting State of
Utah retirement benefits as a result of his 33 years of service to
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Alpine School District.

There is little logic to Alpine School

District's denial of early retirement benefits to Mr. Crittenden,
where the State of Utah currently grants Mr. Crittenden retirement
benefits based upon the same criteria.
The District Court, however, ruled that Mr. Crittenden "is
not

the

type

implemented."

of

administrator

(Ruling, at 13).

for

whom

this

policy

was

Again, the District Court, on

Summary Judgment Motion, must construe all facts in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party—in this case, Mr. Crittenden,
fBrown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, (Utah App. 1994)).
The District Court admitted that Mr. Crittenden did not
assert his motivation for seeking early retirement, and that he did
not state that he sought early retirement

because of health

problems, the work had become more difficult, or because he wanted
to get away from the daily grind.

(Ruling, at 13). At the same

time, the District Court did impute to Mr. Crittenden a motivation
for seeking early retirement benefits out of a desire "to hang on
to some benefit at a time when he was suspended and his termination
was imminent."

(Ruling, at 13). Such a construction of the facts

was not an inquiry as to whether a reasonable jury faced with the
evidence presented could return a verdict for Mr. Crittenden, but
was, rather, an outright weighing of the facts by the District
Court, and was therefore in error.

See W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio

Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).
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D.

Lack of Procedural

Retirement

Due Process Prior to Deprivation

of

Early

Benefits

The District Court's imputation of motivation to Mr. Crittenden demonstrates yet another difficulty in the Court's decision to
uphold denial of Mr, Crittenden's early retirement benefits.

Mr.

Crittenden's early retirement benefits are a protected property
interest.

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, (Utah App.

1988); Backman v. Bateman. 263 P.2d 561, (Utah 1953)). Thus, prior
to any deprivation of those benefits, Mr. Crittenden was entitled
to some kind of hearing to satisfy the procedural due process
requirements of both the Utah and federal constitutions.

Alpine

School District makes no claim that it allowed Mr. Crittenden any
hearing; rather, Mr. Crittenden applied for the benefits prior to
the effective date of his termination, and was summarily denied
those benefits without the benefit of any hearing whatsoever.

E.

Judicial

Legislation

The decision to deny Mr. Crittenden his contractually vested
rights to early retirement benefits was based squarely upon the
whim and caprice of district administrators.

No policy provisions

gave the administrators guidelines to decide as they did.

The

District Court erred in interpreting the policy, absent language in
the district policy itself, so as to deny Mr. Crittenden early
retirement benefits.
Regardless of whether the District Court saw the policy as a
contract or as a governing and regulating instrument, it is the
i

function of the District Court to construe the policy as it is
written, not as it could or might have been written.

(See Hoth v.

White, 799 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah App. 1990)(holding that the court
"will not rewrite a contract to alleviate a contracting party's
mistake, but will construe it according to its terms as it is
written."); American States Ins. Co. v. Utah Transit. 699 P.2d
1210, 1213-14 (Utah 1985)(Zimmerman, J. concurring)(An omission may
simply reflect a legislative oversight; however, the statute as
written is the statute the court must construe: "If the current law
does not accurately reflect the intent of its makers, changes . .
. should be addressed to the legislature."); see also Transp. Auth.
v. Transp. Auth. Retirement Bd., 493 N.E.2d 848, 852 (Mass. 1986)
(holding that it is the function of the court to construe the law
as written, "and an event for which no provision has been made does
not justify judicial legislation.")).
The fact that under Alpine School District policy employees
are not subject to forfeiture of early retirement benefits in case
of termination for cause, whether through oversight or inadvertence
by the makers of the policy, does not justify stretching the words
of the school district policy in order to accomplish a result not
expressed or intended by that policy. An event or contingency for
which no provision in the policy has been made, such as the event
of

Mr.

Crittenden's

termination,

legislation by the District Court.
was therefore in error.
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does

not

justify

judicial

The District Court's decision

CONCLUSION
Mr. Crittenden has been denied his early retirement which
have considerable value in terms of health and accident insurance
and a regular cash income, because he used a school district
purchase

order

to

purchase

approximately

$650.00

worth

of

automotive goods, an activity which was common and acceptable among
school district employees.

Rather than matching the infraction

with a proportional penalty, Alpine School District has disregarded
constitutionally guaranteed procedural due process to which Mr.
Crittenden is entitled, both in deprivation of his employment and
in his early retirement benefits.

The judgment of the District

Court must be reversed, if not in whole, then in part.
DATED this

//

day of July, 1997.

DON R. PETERSEN, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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DON R. PETERSEN (2576), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (S01) 377-4991

Our File No. 20,838

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JIM F. CRITTENDEN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO
DEFENDANT
Case No. 930400025
Hon. Guy R. Burningham

Defendant.
COMES NOW the plaintiff and submits the following interrogatories to the defendant
to be answered in writing, under oath, by an officer of the defendant, in accordance with Rule
33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Describe the contract referred to in the Third Defense of defendant's Answer,

specifically identifying the contract; stating whether it is an oral contract or a written contract;
the date that it was entered into between the parties; who executed the contract on behalf of the
defendant.

22.

Set forth specifically the manner in which the plaintiff did not faithfully perform

all duties assigned to him as alleged in paragraph 11 of plaintiff s Complaint and denied by the
defendant.
23.

Set forth the manner in which the defendant allegedly followed the provisions

of Utah Code Ann. § 53A-8-104, as alleged in paragraph 14 of plaintiffs Complaint.
24.

Set forth the manner in which the plaintiff did not meet the requirements set

forth in § 49-2-802, Utah Code Ann., as alleged in paragraph 20 of plaintiffs Complaint and
denied by the defendant.
25.

Set forth all facts upon which defendant relies to substantiate its denial of

paragraph 21 of plaintiffs Complaint, wherein it is alleged that the defendant has failed and
refused to allow the plaintiff to apply for early retirement, which allegation the defendant has
denied.
26.

State whether or not the plaintiff has, in fact, filled out a form for early

retirement.
27.

If the answer to the preceding interrogatory is in the affirmative, set forth the

date upon which the application for early retirement was filled out by the plaintiff and the date
that it was placed in the plaintiffs file with the district offices of defendant.
28.

State whether or not the defendant has ever allowed its employees to use district

resources and telephones to make long distance telephone calls for which the employees were
allowed to reimburse the district for said expenses.
5

APPENDIX B

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
J. MARK WARD - 4436
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Alpine School District
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JIM F. CRITTENDEN,

:

Plaintiff,

ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
SET OF INTERROGATORIES

:

v.

:

ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT,

:

Defendant,

Defendant

:
:
:

answers

Civil No. 930400025
Judge Burningham

plaintiff's

first

set

of

interrogatories as follows:
Interrogatory No. l:
in

the

Third

Defense

of

Describe the contract referred to
defendant's

Answer,

specifically

identifying the contract; stating whether it is an oral contract or
a written contract; the date that it was entered into between the
parties; who executed the contract on behalf of the defendant.
Angwgy

£a

Interrogatory

No.

l:

Written

materials

evidencing the contract between the parties include the actual
written contractual documents signed and executed each year between

Answer to Interrogatory No. 25: Defendant never stopped
plaintiff from applying for early retirement. Plaintiff has failed
to prove otherwise.

Without waiving its position as to whether

plaintiff was entitled to so-called early retirement, defendant,
through Assistant Superintendent Dr. Susan Stone, sent plaintiff,
because he specifically requested them, the forms that constitute
an employee's application for early retirement. Also, the District
made it clear to plaintiff that it would cooperate in any way
possible to facilitate Mr. Crittenden's drawing out his normal
state retirement from the state retirement office. However, it was
the position of the District that plaintiff did not qualify for the
District's early retirement policy since his employment ceased as
a result of a job action initiated against him by the District.
Interrogatory No. 26: State whether or not the plaintiff
has, in fact, filled out a form for early retirement.
Answer to Interrogatory No. 26:

As indicated in the

preceding interrogatory, the appropriate forms to apply for such
early retirement

were requested

by plaintiff;

the defendant,

through Assistant Superintendent Stone, mailed these forms to the
plaintiff; and the forms were never sent back to Dr Stone's
knowledge.

However, this was not dispositive of the District's

decision to deny plaintiff's request to participate in the District
early retirement program.

The plaintiff, by himself and through

his attorney, communicated to defendant his desire to participate
in the District early retirement program, and the District was well
enough aware of this desire.

Defendant's denial of plaintiff's
13

participation in this early retirement program was not due to any
imagined irregularity with respect

to whether the forms were

properly filled out, and defendant objects to and deplores any
insinuation on the part of the plaintiff to suggest that defendant
denied plaintiff early retirement due to a clerical oversight in
the filling out of forms-

As communicated

over and over to

plaintiff and his attorney by defendant and its attorney in 1991,
plaintiff failed to qualify for district early retirement because
his employment was involuntarily terminated due to criminal acts.
Interrogatory No. 27:

If the answer to the preceding

interrogatory is in the affirmative, set forth the date upon which
the application

for early

retirement

was

filled

out by

the

plaintiff and the date that it was placed in the plaintiff's file
with the district offices of defendant.
Aiigwsr to IpteSTPqWry NP» ? 7 :

See

the answer

to

the

preceding interrogatory.
Interrogatory No. 28: State whether or not the defendant
has ever allowed its employees to use district resources and
telephones to make long distance telephone calls for which the
employees were allowed to reimburse the district for said expenses.
Answer

to Interrogatory

No. 26:

In

the past

the

District's policy in this regard is that employees keep track of
their personal long distance calls on a log and then periodically
reimburse the district for the cost of such calls.

In recent

years, some schools in the District have gone to a policy that
requires employees to use their own personal long distance credit
14
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

JIM F. CRITTENDEN.
Plaintiff.
VS.

ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO.
DEPOSITION OF;
JIM F. CRITTENDEN
Held March 25. 1996
REPORTED BY:
RENEE L. STACY. CSR. RPR

Deposition of JIM F. CRUTENDEN. taken on behalf
of the Defendant, at 160 Bast 300 South, Sixth Floor,
Salt Lake city. Utah, comencino at 9:05 a.n. on
March 25, 1996. before RENEE L. STACY, Certified
Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter
and Notary Public in and for the state of Utah,

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

March 25. 1996
9:05 a.n.
PROCEEDINGS
JIM F. CRITTENDEN
called as a witness at the instance and request of
the Defendant, having been first duly sworn, was
exanlned and testified as follows:
EXAMINATION
6Y MR. HARD:
Q
Good noming. Mr. Crittenden, would you
state your full n a m for the record, please.
A
My given nana Is Jimie Frazier
Crittenden.
Q
All right. Mr. Crittenden. I had served on
you through your counsel a Notice of Deposition and a
request to produce docunents at the taking of this
deposition and I'd like to go through that, first of
all. and see what you have pursuant to that request.
Maybe your counsel can handle that, but — do you
have that, counsel, or —
MR. PETERSEN.* Sure. Do you want to go off
the record on this?
MR. VARD: Let's go off for a ninute and

pursuant to Notice.
• •• •
PAGE 4

PAGE 2

APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

PPH R.

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Salt Lake city. UT 84111

INDEX
EXAMINATION
BY MR. VARD

3

BY MR. PETERSEN

170

EXHIBITS
Defendant's
Harked Discussed
l
6-5-91 handwritten letter
66
67

REQUESTS OF COUNSEL - BY n*. HARD
Page 137. line 1 Date of last paycheck

DFPTNttY PPPnPTTVff QPTnrrrrc

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

see what you've got and then we'll nake a record.
(Discussion off the record.)
MR. HARD: Let's go back on the record.
Q
Mr. Crittenden, your counsel has Just
handed ne various docunents which purport to be in
response to defendant '9 request to produce docunents
at the taking of this deposition. To your knowledge.
sir. are these docunents which your counsel has just
handed ne. are these all the docunents that you have
In your possession that is responsive to these
requests to produce?
A
H e n , sir. without going through each one
specifically — I would have to look at then
specifically so that I knew possibly which one you
referred to or whatever, you know. There's quite a
pile there.
Q
Have you had an opportunity to review the
request to produce docunents that I have referred to?
A
Yes. sir.

20
21
22
23

Q
Do you recall that there were
approxinateiy — well, there are exactly 32 requests
that were set forth in writing. Did you have a
chance to review those 32 written requests?

24
25

MR. PETERSEN: Maybe I can Just clarify.
They're the ones that we could find at this tine. Ue

\ir
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A
No. It Isn't.
Q
Why not?
A
Because — for several things. Nunber one,
I ouess what you do for one. you ought to do for all.
and you can't do that. That isn't feasible. It was
done for Dave Beal because he happened to be a friend
of nine. I knew vhat I uas doing at the tins that
took place, with the understanding It would he paid
back. I didn't try to take advantage of the
district. Dave Beal is as honest as the day is long.
Q
But as a general natter, you would agree
that —
A
It was wrong.
Q
It's Just not good policy?
A No.
Q
It's not right to be — no natter how
trustworthy the individual is. it's not approprlats
to be using district resources that way?
A
It isn't.
Q
Let ne see If I have any nore questions
about this Dave Beal natter. We'll return to a
question I touched on earlier. When I asked It. It
kind of got us into the Dave Beal subject natter,
but are you saying that the district's policy was
such that you — that people who use this kind of —

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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Then, with the change of sdntnlstrstlon —
Q
imtch uas when, roughly?
A
At the tine I believe when Clark cox cane
in as superintendent.
Q
Okay.
A
The district said no nore purchases out of
the warehouse.
Q
The district changed their policy?
A Yes.
Q
Did you have a problen with that change?
A
NO. NO.
Q
Okay.
A
No. I had no problen with it.
Q
Okay. Go ahead.
A
And then. see. there -wes s tins — when I
took this Job in transportation, the nechanics could
bring their vehicles into the bus garage, service
then, keep track of the oil they put beck in then.
pay for the filter, end they're on their way. Really
all they used was the hoist end the electricity If it
was after hours.
Then with the change of people in
personnel, with Dr. Lloyd, then to Jack HcKelvey.
when Jack cane in. It was — you couldn't use any
district resource, period.
47
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strike that.
Are you saying that people who use district
property like this for their own use. are you saying
that, by virtue of sone policy of the district, that
they have a right not to be terninated if they're
caught?
A
l*n saying that they ought to be consistent
in their policy.
Q
well, let's understand, first, what their
policy is. Okay. You're telling ne — I think what
you're telling ne is they're not being consistent in
their policy. What do you understand their policy to
be?
A
Okay. Let *s take 34 years. There was a
tine, U P until Just a feu years ago, when you could
go to the warehouse and buy anything the warehouse
stocked and It would cone out of your paycheck.
Q
You could buy it and they would deduct it
fron your paycheck?
A
Yes. You could pick it up, order it. and
it would cone out of your paycheck. That went on for
years. Having purchased a power saw, steel for pipe
panels for a fence — l*n Just thinking of a few
things that I purchased there. Fertilizer, water
softener salt, a lauimower.

46
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Q
So that *s a rule that cane when Jack
HcKelvey cane in?
A
I believe, yes. when Jack HcKelvey cane in.
Q
When did that happen. Just roughly?
A
Let's see. Hou long hes he been there? I
guess he's been there since around '8B or '89.
sonething like that.
Q
In any event, to your recollection, that
rule cane out when HcKelvey cane in?
A
Yes. uh-nuh.
Q
Okay.
A
Because, see. natntenance people were
rebuilding engines, doing things in their area.
according to the hearsay of nechanics. I don't pay
any attention to that hearsay, but It was happening
in ny departnent. I saw vehicles in there and I
didn't think the guys were really taking advantage.
but I understood the —
Q
The rule?
A The rule.
Q
I think you Just answered ny question when
you said I understand the rule, but 1*11 ask it.
anyway. So did you have a problen with this rule
that cane out of the district when nocelvev cane in?
A
No. sir. I didn't. I didn't have a problen.

I
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Q And did you eeek to try to clean things —
well —
A ye did.
Q yeah. Did you try to clean things up?
A Absolutely, ve did.
Q In other words, you tried to clear up this
problan of personal vehicles inside the garage?
A I did. I vent and called a meting of ny
mechanics and ve told then vhat the new policy vas.
and as far as I know, to this day thev adhere to It.
Q You let then know that that vas the policy?
A Certainly.
Q You told then you supported the policy?
A You hat.
Q You told then that there would be action
taken against then If thev violated the policy?
A No. I didn't tell then that.
Q Veil, did vou out any teeth behind your —
vhat teeth vas there behind your ultlnatun? Just
your authority, your atatanant?
A I don't have to threaten people.
Q Hell. okay. So. vhat? Just the authority
of — you're the boas, vou nade the statement, and
that-8 authority enough? I man. that's fine If
that's the case. I Just vant to know.

I
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that he used a purchase order for his own personal
Iten efter this cane down on ne. Vent to en
assistant superintendent. Ne vas told get it paid
for. and nothing happened to hln.
Q Vhat principal vas that?
A It vas B U I Delaney. He vas at Pleasant
erove High School at the tine.
Q Hhen did this occur?
A I can't tell vou the dates on it. B U I
will testify to It. I've talked to B U I about It.
Q He vas principal where?
A At Pleasant Grove high School at the tine.
He's now the principal at Mountain View High School.
Q This happened while you vers enploved?
A Uh-huh. So It vas probably around in 1990.
possibly.
Q All right.
A Maybe the first part of *9l.
Q All right. So I see this — I*n trying to
organize all this, and the way I see It is you're
saying that there are instances where people have
used property, district property in one fom or
fashion, and whatever has happened to then, they have
not been teminated?
A Right.
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A Certainly. I asked people to do things;
thev would do it. I did not have to threaten
anyone.
Q Okay. That vas the lav and you laid It
down, right?
A My people knew, bus drivers. You know, the
safety of kids vas always a concern for ne.
Q But as far as people having their personal
vehicles in there and using things for their personal
gain or their personal autos or vhat ever, you told
then that had to atop, right?
A

J

Absolutely.

0
into all
A
Q

Okay. Understanding that ~ and we'll go
those instances in a ninute.
Okay.
I vant to know every instance you're aware

5 of.
6

Q Okay. So than vas that your understanding
of the policy?
A Uh-huh.
Q So I guess that brings m full circle then
to ny question — back to ny original question, which
is: Mhat would there be in the district's policy
that would give you the right or anybody the right
vno nlauaas district property to not be teminated If
they're caught?
A He or anyone elae?
Q sure,
A I would like to be treated like everyone
elae. I have a principal that will testify today
S0
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A Okay.
Q And I'n sure sone of these docunents relate
to it. plus you nay just have your recollection.
like this Delaney. You nay not have any
documntation. but vou have Just your recollection.
But est ting that aside for a ninute, understanding
your contention, which is that there are sone
district enplovees who have used district property
and have not been teminated, ny question, air. is
this: Are you aware of any policy, district
policy — and let's start vlth written policy, okay?
Are you aware of any written policy which gives
aonaone like that, aomone vno is caught n l SUB ins
district property for their own personal gain or
whatever, are you aware of any written policy which
would give that person the right not to be
teminated? And if you're not. fine. I just vant to
know.
A No.
Q

Okay.

I
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bit. Are vou aware or any written letters or other
form of written connun I cation fron the district or
anybody on the district level fron vhich you could
infer that persons vno get cauont using district
property for their own use have the right not to be
temtnated? I'm asking the sane question that I'd
ask with respect to policies, but I'n now shifting to
any kind of written connun l cat ion. other than a
written policy.
A
Not that I can recall of. I don't rananber
anything like that where it said they'd be — what
you're saving, where you're saying that they would be
terminated.
G
No. I'n saying that — okay. You're
saying — you're telling ne, Mr. Crittenden, that
you're snare of sone people who have used district
property for their own use. and whatever the district
did to than, they did not teminate then.
A
Correct.
Q
All right. And I asked you a nlnute ago.
Just to nake sure you understand the question.
whether you're aware of any policy that would protect
a person like that, any district written policy that
would say that If a person Is caught using district
property for their own use. they should not be
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people who get ceught using district property for
their own use should not be terminated?
i*n Just shifting the question a little bit
now to — we already asked the question about
policies. Nov I'm Just asking s question shout
letters or nenoranda or bulletins. Are there any
such written communications that would give a peraon
the right not to be terminated if they were caught
using district property for their own use?
A
I suppose not.
Q
Okay. Sane question but now I'm going to
shift It e little bit differently. Are you ewere of
any verbal statements by district level people thet
would give e person the right not to be terminated in
the event thev were caught using district property
for their own use? Notice I'm Just shifting the
question. I started with policies. Then I started
wtth any written communications. Now I'm talking
about any verbal communications.
A
Yee. I understand. To answer your
question, in 34 years. Hark. I never had a problem
with Alpine School Dletrict, and I don't remember in
any of the superintendent's meetings, any of the
meetings I ever attended where that specifically was
a concern or a problem. I recall no verbalization on
55
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terminated, that whatever happens to then, they
should not be terminated? Are you aware of any euch
policy?
A
To answer your question. Hark, it seens to
ne that the policy ought to say if, in fact, there
was a problen. that you would have due process. You
could et least have e hearing. I know of no policy
like that.
Q
Okay. But you would agree — you haven't
quite answered ny question. And I appreciate your
point, and that's something I'll take note of, but
let's deal with ny question for a ninute here. And
I'n sorry I can't state It nore clearly or nore
artfully, but I'n going to try it again.
Are you aware of any written policy by the
school district which says that persons who get
caught using district property for their own use
should not be temtnated?
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20

A
I can't recall of any policy like that that
I'n — I'n not aware of any.
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Q
Sane question, but now I would ask it with
respect to any written communications, like bulletins
or letters. Are you aware of any bulletins or
letters or memoranda or any kind of written
communication from the district that would imply that
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that.
Q
Feir enough. I appreciate that. And
thanks for bearing with ne on that line of
questions. So if I understand your contention — and
that's the purpose of this deposition, for me to
totally understand and have it out clear as I can.
If I understand your contention, your contention is
that you should not have been terminated for using
district property for your own personal use because
others weren't? Is that your position?
A No.
Q
What's your position?
A
ny position is. at this tine. Hark. I
earned ny early retirement. I gave them 34 years.
And I love ny Job. I love people in that district
where I live. I'm very veil known in that area. Ry
position is ny family and I deserve that early
retirement, especially the insurance that they took
away from me.
Q
The nodical insurance?
A
Yes. sir. Now. whether or not the powers
that be can administer their policies and do it
equitable for the number of employees they have,
that'& their problen. Ry position is that before I
was temtnated I deserved a hearing. I received no
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hearing.
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It wasn't a eecret what they, the Board of
Education, fired ne for fron the etandpolnt of what I
did. It was not a eecret. the ttens outlined In
Susan Stone's letter why they let ne go and what I
was teminated for. Ue have discussed one of then at
length. Dave Beal's situation. I believe.
The other, there Is s statemnt here fron
Al vuksintcirs business that was an error, a billing
error. The other one they have is nv use of a
purchase order to Rick Darner Port, le really the
reason they let ne go. I had a nechanlc with ne. He
was with ne when I took the purchase order beck to
the desk, and I was teminated for that.
Q
Hell, let's go back to nv question. Your
contention, than, goes just to early retiremnt?
A
And danaoes nou.
Q
Hell, are you saying you had a right not to
be teminated?
A
I'n saying I had e right to a hearing that
I was denied. I was not given e hearing. I was
fired on the spot, after 34 veers, and 1*11 defy you
to find a person down there that said I wasn't a
productive enplovee for 34 veers. I don't care what
ares YOU so to. fron the tine I coached, that I
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the school district?
A
It was known to the world.
Q
Okay. Which would Include the school
district?
A
Certainly.
Q
Okay. Hell, so — I realize, you know, vou
don't knov the — you nay not appreciate the fine
legal distinctions here that perhaps your counsel and
I would delve into, but I'n trying to understand what
the basts — what the bone or your contention is. if
you will, and what I'n hearing is that the bone of
voir contention is that vou weren't given a hearing.
A
I wasn't, no. sir.
Q
Let's talk about the basic Question.
though, of whether imat you did and what you pled to.
which was use of district property — well, we
won't — I won't try to characterize what vou pled
to. because vou said you can't renenber. but let'a
approach It again.
Hhen we talk about what vou did. the use of
the property, would vou agree that, when we talk
about district policy, as a natter of policy, that
that's an offense which is the basis for
tern I nation?
MR. PETERSEN: I'n sorry. I didn't follow
59
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taught, that I was a vice principal t i l l I went to
the district office.
Q
And what would you have done if you had a
hearing?
A
I would liked to have explained to those
people why I used the purchase order, the way it cane
about, and have a nechanic testify as to what was
said to hin when I picked the stuff up and as I
returned it to the garage.
Q
Didn't you plead guilty In the crininal
prosecution?
A
On a reduced charge.
Q
What did you plead to?
MR. PETERSEN: If sou renenber.
A
I can't renenber the — hou It was stated.
Hark. Maybe Don can look at it.
Q
(BY MR. HARD) Are you aware that the fact
of your crininal Investigation and sour ultinats plea
were facts that ware known to the school district?
A
Huh-uh. I didn't knov — I didn't know
anything was even going on as far as an
investigation.
Q
Hhat. I m a n is the ultinate outcone of that
investigation, which was a plea on your part. I m a n .
were you aware that that was a fact that was known to

S8
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that question. Hhat was that again, nou?
Q
(BY MR. HARD) would you agree that what
you did here, the use of the property that you did do
here, that vou did carry out. that that is a basis —
as a ratter of district policy, that is a basis for
the district to teminate your enploynent?
MR. PETERSEN: Nou. are ue talking
specifically about the Susan Stone letter? Which
instance are we talking about?
MR. HARD: we're talking about the totality
of what he did here that was — you nentioned three
incidents, right?
MR. PETERSEN: They're the ones that are
nentioned in Susan Stone's letter.
MR. HARD: Right. Hell. okay. Pair
enough. Let's go to Susan Stone's letter.
The reasons for temination, she says, are
specific actions which Involve your nisuse of
district resources to pay for repairs to your
personal vehicle, a repair on a friend's personal
vehicle and repairs on your son-in-lave vehicle.
You have adnltted to the first two allegations.
Let's stop right there. First of all. is
that correct? You did adnlt to the first two
allegations?

I

DEPOMAX REPORTING SERVICES, LLC (801) 328-1188

W

e
7

e
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Hoo do uou put a dollar alon on tan.
A
fifteen i•are of a person's life?
Veil. I'n assesstno economic loas right
C
now, air You know, I'm Just — anyway — okay. I
think I ave an Idea of where you're con 1 no fron.
bat** talk about — sou talk about
A
economics and insurance, and ny wife's colitis
because of nerves, and we're talking econonlcs.
right?
Q
yell, you're talking the acononlc value of
the health Insurance that vou lost. Does aha have
Insurance through her work?
A
She's picked ne up. but her Insurance lan't
nearly as good as the district's.
Q
Are you still in that gap before you can
get Hedlcare or Medicaid or whatever?
A
Yeeh.
Q
Are vou?
A
Uh-huh.
Q
Hhat about — lan't there eons kind of a
retirement benefit that Includes a health benefit as
part of your regular retirement or not?
A
Pron abere?
Q
I'n asking.
A
I don't think so. Not that I know of.
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allowed or had a policy, whatever, that that could be
dooe?
A
Yes.
Q
Okay. Nou. ware there any other incidents
where you used district resources to pay repairs for
a personal vehicle, other than that one?

A
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NO.

Q

Okay. She says the next reason —
MR. HARD: Excuse ne. Mean mean!no your
own personal vehicle?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes.
Q
She states the next reason, a repair of a
friend's personal vehicle. Now. you testified as to
parts that vera purchased for David Baal.
A
Yes. air.
Q
Here there any other friends' vehicles.
aside fron the one of David Baal vou Just testified
A
No. air.
Q
Now. he was an employee of the diatrict.
was he not?

A

Yes.

•
|

1
1

Q

And he was allowed to pay it back, was he

A

Yes. he was.

1

1

not?

»_i
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MR. HARD: Okay. Just one ninute here.
(Tine lapse.) Thanks for your tine. I have no
further questions.
MR. PETERSEN: I just have a couple
follow-up questions. Can I get Susan Stone's letter
there?
MR. HARD: Oh. veah. The June 5th letter?
MR. PETERSEN: Yes.
EXAMINATION
BY MR. PETERSEN:
Q
Jin. referring to Dr. Susan Stone's letter
to you of June 5th, 1931, she states in the second
paragraph. "The reasons for termination are specific
actions which involve your nlauae of diatrict
resources to pay repairs to your personal vehicle.*
Now, you've testified as to an incident that happened
when vou bought aone parte at Rick Warner Ford; la
that true?
A
Yas. sir.
Q
And you used those parte and the diatrict
paid for then?
A
At the tine.
Q
And you reimbursed the district?
A
Yes. air.
Q
And it's your position that the district

'

to?
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Q
And he was not terminated, was he?
A
No. He's still working.
Q
Then the third reason, she says, "And
repairs to your son-m-lav's vehicle." Nou. you've
testified as to your son-m-lav?
A
Yes. sir.
Q
And there was an improper billing?
A
That's correct.
Q
Okay. Here there any other incidents.
other than this one that vou testified to. tnvolvtns
a son-in-law?
A
None.
Q That son-in-lav or another son-ln-lav?
A No. air.
Q
So they're the three Incidents; la that
correct?
A Yea.
Q
Are vou aware of anything alee that ehe
rafere to?
A
No. air.
MR. PETERSEN: Okay. That's all.
MR. WARD: Thanks.
(Whereupon the taking of the deposition
was concluded at 1:10 p.n.)
••• •
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